Paperwise, Inc. fka Techknowlogy Acquistion, Inc. v. Jones Jensen Orton & Company and Robert Gordon Jones : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Paperwise, Inc. fka Techknowlogy Acquistion, Inc.
v. Jones Jensen Orton & Company and Robert
Gordon Jones : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael L. Deamer; Randle, Deamer, McConkie & Lee; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Michael J. Petro; Young, Kester & Petro; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Paperwise, Inc. v. Jones Jensen Orton & Company, No. 20010888 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3540
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAPERWISE, INC.,fka 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, 
INC., a corporation 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
CaseNo.:20010888-CA 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & COMPANY, 
a Utah Partnership, and ROBERT GORDON 
JONES, an individual, 
Defendant/Appellees. 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES - JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & COMPANY 
AND ROBERT GORDON JONES 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone (801) 489-3294 
Michael L. Deamer 
RANDLE, DEAMER & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
Jones, Jensen, Orton & Company and 
Robert Gordon Jones 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
""1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAPERWISE, INC.,fka : 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, 
INC., a corporation : Case No.: 20010888-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & COMPANY, 
a Utah Partnership, and ROBERT GORDON : 
JONES, an individual, 
: (Oral Argument Requested) 
Defendant/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES - JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & COMPANY 
AND ROBERT GORDON JONES 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Michael J. Petro Michael L. Deamer 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO RANDLE, DEAMER & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
101 East 200 South Jones, Jensen, Orton & Company and 
Springville, UT 84663 Robert Gordon Jones 
Telephone (801) 489-3294 139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I 
PAPERWISE CANNOT ASSUME OR CREATE FACTS THAT ARE NOT 
ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD TO SUPPORT EXPERT'S OPINION OR ITS 
CLAIM THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE 10 
A. BRAMBLE'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT 12 
B. BRAMBLE'S SECOND AFFIDAVIT 13 
C. BRAMBLE'S THIRD AFFIDAVIT 16 
D. JONES 1994 DEPOSITION 17 
E. COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS 19 
POINT II 
THE TAP ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE WAS NEVER SOLD OR 
TRANSFERRED TO PAPERWISE 20 
i 
POINT III 
PAPERWISE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES 21 
POINT IV 
PAPERWISE CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE UNDER UTAH LAW IN THE 
ABSENCE OF PRIVITY 23 
CONCLUSION 29 
ADDENDUM 
u 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited: 
Bank of Miami Beach v. Neuman. 163 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App.) 23 
Barnard v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
905 P.2d 317 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) 21 
Bearden v. Croft. 31 P.3d 537 1 5, 2001 Ut. 76, 428 
Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (UT. 2001) 1, 2 
Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction. 754 P.2d 672 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1988) 25 
Credit Alliance Corporation v. Arthur Anderson and Company. 483 N.E. 2d 110 
(Ct. App. NY 1985), later proceeding 1988 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 850 and on remand 
542 NYS 2d 901, reversed on other grounds 541 NYS 2d. 433 27, 28 
Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) 11 
Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Company. 529 P.2d 806 (UT. 1974) . . . 26, 27 
Norton v. Blackum. 669 P.2d 857 (Ut. 1983) 11 
Olson v. Salt Lake City School District. 724 P.2d 960, 964 
(UT. 1986) 21 
Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021 (Ut. 1968) 11 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Ut. 1989) 21 
Shire Development v. Frontier Investment. 779 P.2d 221 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) 25 
Treloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747 (Ut. 1985) 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) 11 
iii 
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche and Niven, 174 N.E. 441 
(Ct. App. NY. 1931) 27, 28 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 538 (Ut. 1973) . 11 
Statutes Cited: 
U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) 16, 23, 25 
U.C.A. §58-26-1 etseq 24 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Rules Cited: 
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c) 19 
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(e) 11 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 602 11 
Other Authorities Cited: 
1 Am. Jur. 2d. Actions, Section 69, 70 23 
22 Am. Jur. 2d. Damages, Section 3, page 15 23 
AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 560 13 
AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 530.01-530.02 13 
Black's Law Dictionary. Revised Fourth Edition (1968), at page 1128 . . 19 
SAS (Statement of Accounting Standards) #1, AU §561 17 
IV 
JURISDICTION 
Appellees Jones, Jensen & Orton & Company and Robert Gordon Jones (herein 
collectively referred to as "JJOC") do not contest the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and admits the court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Are there any "material facts" that would prevent the District Court from 
granting summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Appellate courts view facts in the light most favorable to losing party below. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft. 31 P.3d 537 t 5, 
2001 Ut. 76, 428 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (UT. 2001). 
2. Does Appellant have any admissible evidence to support its contention 
that the TAP account receivable was transferred to Appellant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Bearden v. Croft, supra, cited above. 
3. Does Appellant have any admissible evidence that it suffered any 
damages? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Bearden v. Croft, supra, cited above. 
1 
4. Can Appellant maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation or 
negligence under Utah law in the absence of privity? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. Beardenv. Croft, 31 P.3d 
537 1 5, 2001 Ut. 76, 428 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (UT. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(All references are to the court record "R" with page number following) 
Appellant Paper wise (herein "Paper wise") brought an action for negligence and 
negligent misrepresentation against JJOC for accounting malpractice based on JJOC's March 
31, 1993 audit of a company known as Techknowlogy, Inc., a Utah corporation (herein 
referred to as "TKI") \ The complaint was originally filed in August of 1996. On at 
least one occasion JJOC moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute which was denied. 
(R. 757-759) More than five years later after discovery was closed and just prior to 
the trial, on approximately August 27, 2001, the District Court granted JJOC's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and entered Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment on October 4, 2001. A correct copy of the signed Findings of Fact, 
I "JJOC filed an Answer and a Third Party Complaint against the officers and directors 
of TKI which complaint was voluntarily dismissed upon the court's granting of the 
summary judgment motion on August 27, 2001." 
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Conclusions of Law and Judgment are attached hereto and are slightly different than 
the unsigned Findings and Conclusions attached to Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
JJOC substantially disagrees with Paperwise's rendition of the facts which 
variously asserts facts not in evidence, misstates facts from discovery, cites evidence 
from other proceedings that are not part of the record or creates new facts. JJOC will 
deal with the factual misstatements in the course of its argument herein. 
1. In approximately 1989, JJOC was hired to audit the financial records of 
TKI on an annual basis. JJOC was subsequently requested to do its annual year end 
audit for the period ending March 31, 1993. Jones Deposition pages 23-24, (R 899) 
Christensen2 Deposition page 62 (R 932). 
2. No other entity hired Defendant JJOC to perform said audit nor did any 
entity at any time pay for the audit services performed. Jones Deposition pages 23-
24,(R 899) Christensen Deposition pages 87-88, (R 934) Edwards Deposition pages 40, 
66, 71-72 (R 914, 916, 918). 
3. TKI did not hire JJOC to perform an audit in connection with the 
proposed asset acquisition agreement with Plaintiff or with an entity known as Newco, 
2 The corporate officers of TKI were Larry Edwards, Steven Christensen and Winston 
Lee. References are to the Edwards, Christensen and Lee depositions who were each 
deposed twice within the five year pendency of the case. 
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Charles Pace or any other entity or individual from Texas. It was merely the annual 
audit. Deposition of Edwards pages 71-72, (R 918), Deposition of Lee pages 50-51, 
71-75, (R 907-908), Deposition of Christensen pages 87-88, (R934), Jones Deposition 
page 56 (R 904). 
4. JJOC undertook to perform their auditing in April of 1993 and completed 
their field work on May 3, 1993. The audit report was issued dated May 17, 1993 (R 
704-715). Jones Deposition pages 54-55 (R 904). 
5. In the course of its business, TKI lent a company known as 
Techknowlogy Asia Pacific (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") over $250,000.00 for 
office expenditures and signed a contract with TAP for TAP to repay TKI. (R 248-
260) Deposition of Christensen pages 79-80 (R 933). 
6. During the course of its audit, JJOC sent a positive written confirmation 
to TAP to confirm an account receivable of approximately $250,000.00. JJOC 
received a signed contract from TAP memorializing the obligation of TAP to reimburse 
TKI for $250,000.00. JJOC also verified the existence of source documents (cancelled 
checks) totaling at least $250,000.00 evidencing actual payments to TKI. Deposition 
of Jones pages 31-35 (R 900-901). 
7. Defendants JJOC were never told until after the completion of the audit 
and after issuance of the audit report on May 17, 1993 that there was a proposed sale 
or a proposed transfer of some of TKI's assets to Appellant, Newco, Charles Pace or -
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other entity controlled by them or any other entity or individual in the State of Texas. 
Deposition of Jones page 56, (R 904), Deposition of Lee pages 73-75, (R 908), 
Deposition of Christensen pages 60, 87, (R 931, 934), Deposition of Edwards pages 
81-82 (R 920). 
8. Edwards, the president of TKI, further explained in his first deposition 
on March 7, 1997 beginning on page 81, (R 920) line 8 as follows: 
"Question: Do you know in fact if there were conversations regarding a deal 
in Texas with Gordon Jones during the period of March 31, 1993 
and June 30, 1993? 
Answer: At this point in time there was no deal in Texas. We were raising 
money. And it certainly is possible we did not tell Gordon we 
were raising money. That's possible. We did not try to hide it. 
But on the other hand, you know, we certainly didn't tell him we 
want you to do a good audit this time as opposed to the slipshod 
audit you are used to doing. We just said it's year end, we need 
to audit the books. And I never felt that I needed to get the 
auditors' blessings to include the audit in the Private Placement 
Memorandum. 
Question: Did you ever tell Gordon Jones that you would be using the 
March 31, 1993 audit in the Private Placement Memorandum? 
Answer: I cannot remember doing that specifically, sir." (Our emphasis) 
(R920, 540, 567). 
9. Christensen, the vice president of TKI, testified that he first learned of 
a deal with Texas people (Appellant Paperwise) in May-June of 1993. Deposition of 
Christensen pages 39-40 (R 298). 
10. The audit report issued on May 17, 1993 dated as of May 3, 1993, 
concluded that TKI was "not a going concern" because it has lost over $533,000.00 in 
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1991, $1.8 million in 1993 and $533,000.00 as of March 31, 1993. Deposition of 
Jones page 68, (R905), Deposition of Christensen page 45 (R 930) ("We were in 
negative cash flow position"), Edwards Deposition pages 45-46 ("we were bankrupt") 
(R915). 
11. Paperwise (formerly known as Techknowlogy Acquisition, Inc.) was a 
corporation formed in May 1993 in Texas for the sole purpose of buying some of the 
assets of TKI. Deposition exhibit 12, page 10.3 Paperwise had no operating history 
and income prior to the acquisition of the assets of TKI on August 16, 1993. There 
was no market value for the stock of Paperwise immediately after the transaction with 
TKI. (Acquisition Agreement paragraph 5.01(a)) (R 405-501) and Paperwise's 
Answers to Interrogatories 20, 14 and 8 dated September 17, 1997 (R 731-734). 
12. The proposed transaction between Paperwise and TKI was reflected in a 
Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23, 1993, (attached to Volume 
4 of court file) and an Asset Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 1993. (R 405-
501) Deposition Exhibit 12. 
13. Under the agreements, Paperwise agreed to issue additional shares of its 
stock on an approximate ratio of 1:2 for the assets of TKI which would then be placed 
in a liquidating trust to be distributed to the shareholders of TKI as a liquidating 
dividend in a C Reorganization. Deposition Exhibit 12 (R405-501). 
3 An actual volume of the Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum, No. 158, is 
enclosed in Volume 4 of the court case file. See page 13 of that document. 
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1 • 1 < Vs part of the Asset Acquisition Agreement, TKI pui poi ted to transfe i 
.ipfiftniiiulch 1>('^HIIHI iiiiiii in ns'lM'ofiSfsffiti* ol sornr accounts receivables, inventory 
miscellaneous assets in return for stock in Paperwise to be given to shareholders 
of TKI. Deposition Exhibit 12 (R 405-501). 
15 Certain assets, accounts and notes receivables including uu -
receivable were leit HI "l"l\ I in \u\) imn iiiafal iialiilidcs Mini nhhj - * 
taxes il illmr Ilk, ml, !lie Kissane and Woodbridge claims and were not transferred to 
Paperwise. Deposition of Christensen pages 86, 107, 1214 (R 934, 935, 938). 
The officers and shareholders of TKI, namely Larry Edwards, Winston 
Lee and Steven Christensen were to receive shares or the new. : nied Papt = ^ -^ , • •. 
. K - * 1996 but 
* received any stock or other consideration for TKI's assets. Deposition of 
Edwards page 103, 94-95, 99, 103, (R 922), Lee Deposition pages 40-41, Deposition 
of Christensen pages 112, 115, 117, 128 (R936, 937, 939). 
mi Alter issuing their May S, 1'W audit icpoii mi M.iv I /, 1^3, HOC1 fnrsi 
learned of the proposed transfer of some of the assets to a group in Texas. On June 30, 
1993, JJOC added a footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 to its audit report disclosing a 
4 The other officers can't remember, Lee Deposition pages 97-98, Edwards Deposition 
pages 60, 93, Plaintiffs witness Kuehne doesn't know, Kuehne Deposition pages 60-
62, 63-64. 
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proposed sale of some of TKI's assets to a corporation in Texas. Deposition of Jones 
pages 55-56, 84 (R 904). The June 30, 1993 Audit Report found at R 876-891. 
18. The asset acquisition deal between TKI and Paperwise closed on August 
16, 1993. TKI ceased to exist as of August 16, 1993. Edwards Deposition pages 97-
98 (R 922). 
19. Paperwise paid no cash and delivered no tangible assets to TKI under the 
Acquisition Agreement. Edwards Deposition II pages 96-97, (R 922) Deposition of 
Christensen pages 112, 115, 117, 118, 128 (R 936, 937, 939). 
20. In approximately January of 1994, six months after the closing, Paperwise 
fired Edwards and Lee and reclaimed or cancelled all of the stock transferred to 
Edwards and Lee as part of the Asset Acquisition Agreement. Edwards Deposition 
pages 100-101, (R 924), Lee Deposition pages 105-106 (R 911). Christensen was 
subsequently terminated in June of 1994. Christensen Deposition pages 112,115, 117, 
118, 128 (R 936, 937, 939). Edwards, Lee and Christensen never actually received 
any stock in TKA. Edwards Deposition page 103, (R 924), Christensen Deposition 
page 112 (R 936). 
21. Edwards, Lee and Christensen, the principal officers, directors and 
shareholders of TKI received nothing from the transaction except limited employment 
for which they actually worked 40 hours per week. Edwards Deposition II page 103, 
8 
Lee Deposition II pages 
• fR936, W , (W). 
22. None of the original shareholders of Paperwise in Texas or elsewhere or 
subsequent Paperwise officers, directors and shareholders ever have been or are 
presently Plaintiffs in the present action. See Complaint 
1
 I"' 1111 P . * i• • • • M « < r i L11 *• 1 1 1 1 1 ' 111, 11 " mi 11 i >ji \ , M M I c o m p u t e r 
softwnrv ;in|iiirwl from TKI, and three years later in 1996 subsequently failed and went 
into Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in Dallas, Texas. Lee Deposition page 9, Christensen 
Deposition page 52. 
[here is noprot * 
liiiiusli'iiid din IMamlill Pain ' nisition Agreement. 
JLJ. riiere is no evidence or proof of any kind that Paperwise transferred 
anything other than its own stock for the assets of TKI, which stock it subsequently 
cancelled and demanded back from Christensen, Edwards and Lee. TKI got nothing 
and ceased to exist (R SIJ:J!). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
JJOC submits that Appellant Paperwise is relying on facts that are not 
established in the record, ignores facts that are established by deposition testimony and 
discovery, rent ,* ,;a.• -u. u-
supp* evidence that the disputed account 
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receivable was ever transferred as part of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The express 
deposition testimony of the corporate officers was that the TAP account receivable was 
not transferred or part of the purchase. Paperwise also refuses to acknowledge clearly 
established facts including, but not limited to: (1) JJOC issued a full written audit 
report on May 17, 1993 prior to any deal for the acquisition for the assets of TKI, (R 
704-715) and (2) there is no tangible evidence that Paperwise suffered any damages. 
Paperwise gave stock in a newly formed corporation for the assets of TKI and six 
months later cancelled and reclaimed its stock but kept the assets of TKI. JJOC 
submits that Paperwise cannot overcome the statutory lack of privity defense. There 
is not any material evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ that could 
establish that JJOC was negligent or that Paperwise was in any way damaged by any 
alleged negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PAPERWISE CANNOT ASSUME OR CREATE FACTS THAT ARE NOT 
ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD TO SUPPORT EXPERT'S OPINION OR 
ITS CLAIM THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
JJOC submits that Paperwise is manufacturing facts, ignoring facts that are 
established by the record or assuming facts to prevent entry of summary judgment. 
This matter had a long history of discovery from August of 1996 through August of 
10 
2001. On the hearing toi (1H Molioiiln Siiiiiiiia" \ IIUIIHUCIII I'-tprniKr nniM not < He 
instantiation iui mar1 >f the facts upon which their 
expert relied and which forms the basis for their claims. They also have not done so 
on appeal. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules o. . .: ,-rocedure require that at fidas Ms must U 
made on pei \vould be admissible in 
I1 I'tlaiiv iiiiil ".liiiilll \liuw affirmatively that affiant is competent to testify as to the 
matters stated therein. See generally: Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Ut. 
1985); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Ut Ct App 1 990); Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d.. 
1021 (I'I l%8>, A supporting affid. 
^ :-*.;j i substantiated opinions and beliefs 
isufficient. Treloggan, supra. Statements in an affidavit that are largely conclusory 
in form and would not be admissible in evidence may not be considered on a motion 
for summary judgment. Norton v. Blackumu 669 I' M 857 11 n I *'N ^ i '\n aflid.n n 
that merely reflects llui aidant's niistilislaiilialnl i niuhi •.lull1; iiinl lair li ditlv 
e \ identiai y facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact. Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 538 (Ut. 1973). 
Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides a witness may not tes .. 
matter unless evidence is introduced sullicienl lo support A IHHII 
personal k n o w i n g ol (In; nnllrr ('urlr, Bramble, Paperwise's expert, has no 
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independent knowledge of any of the facts in the present action. He was not an officer, 
director or participant in the Paperwise acquisition of assets of TKI nor was he 
involved in the audit of the company prior to the acquisition of those assets. Mr. 
Bramble's opinion is purportedly only an expert opinion hired after commencement of 
the litigation to opine on facts that are established by the record. He cannot create 
facts to support opinions he wants to reach. For example: 
A. BRAMBLE'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT. (R 982-990) Paragraph 3 of 
Bramble's first affidavit concludes "I am of the opinion that JJOC could not have 
completed their audit prior to June 30, 1993". This ignores the deposition testimony 
of Appellee Jones on pages 54-55 attached as Exhibit "A" to JJOC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment which shows that the field work was completed on May 3, 1993 
and the full written audit report was issued on May 17, 1993. This audit report was 
the complete report including the opinion letter, the balance sheet and financial 
statements including footnotes. It also ignores the deposition testimony of Winston 
Lee, an officer of TKI, pages 73-75, the deposition testimony of Steve Christensen, an 
officer of TKI, pages 60 and 87 and the deposition of Larry Edwards, the president of 
TKI, pages 81 and 82 as to when JJOC was told of a proposed sale or transfer of TKI's 
assets. 
Paperwise Statement of Facts on page 12 of Appellant's brief states: 
10. "Defendants first issued TKI audit materials on May 17, 1993. 
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11. piaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, 'that "the May 
17th audit materials, which included TKI's balance sheets but no financial 
documents or auditor's report were neither complete nor final. 
Bramble's first affidavit section 3-13, (R984-988)." (Our emphasis). 
This evidence is expressly contrary to the established record. This statement is not 
based on any deposition testimony, admission or record. Appellant cannot cite to the 
record where this occurred , aragrapn v > :;<•• StalnniMil ill 
Facts • - . ' . ' , . " . • tks foundation. 
e Bramble has no independent knowledge this is one of the manufactured facts 
upon which Paperwise inappropriately relies. 
Bramble's first affidavit also opines on "subsequent events" under All, T'A 
Professional Standards \: Section ><>(» and iniulh iiumivs \hv Stainiinii ml Nudnmi; 
Standard (SASl 
., .generally the date of the completion of the field work should be used as the 
date of the independent auditor's report The auditor has no responsibility 
to make any inquiry or carry out any auditing procedures for the period after the 
date of his report." AU Section 530.01-530.02, Dating of the Independent 
Auditor's Report, AICPA Professional Standards. 
I. BRAMBLE'S SECOND AFFIDAVIT" (R: 993-1004 & 236-247) The 
following facts which form the basis for Bramble's second affidavit are not established 
by anything in the record. 
Paragraph 5 - "the $251,509.00 receivable was later reclassified on the 
30, I"1)11),1! balance shed I mm an account te receiv al 
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same amount of $251,509.00". JJOC did not prepare the June 30, 1993 
statements and did not audit the June 30, 1993 balance sheet and takes no 
responsibility for anything appearing on the June 30, 1993 balance sheet. 
Affidavit of Jones (R 128, 130), Affidavit of Christensen (R 132, 134). 
Paragraph 10 of Bramble's second affidavit states "the copy [of the TAP 
Account Receivable] that Gordon Jones initialed was not executed and in fact 
there is no evidence in the documents I reviewed that the agreement was ever 
executed." (Bracketed information added). This factual statement completely 
ignores Deposition Exhibit 2 which is the fully executed and signed agreement 
by Lee Luellen, President of TAP, dated December 4, 1992 and constitutes the 
agreement for the TAP account receivable (R 248-260). This was specifically 
reviewed by JJOC as part of the audit. Oddly enough, Paperwise in its brief on 
pages 11 and 12 refers specifically to this document as the "Master Distributor 
Agreement §31 at R248-260." 
Paragraph 11 of Bramble's second affidavit states that the Master Distributor 
Agreement appears to be "the only documentation obtained and reviewed by 
JJOC to confirm this receivable." (Bramble's emphasis). This statement 
completely ignores Jones' deposition testimony that he reviewed the cancelled 
checks totaling at least $250,000.00 evidencing actual payments by TKI for the 
TAP account receivable. See Appellee's Statement of Facts paragraph 6, Jones 
14 
Deposition pages V 
Paragraph 11 i >l Hi dinhh ', M \1 uul itl l'id;i\ il concludes that there is no evidence 
in JJOC's working papers or the Master Distributor Agreement to suggest that 
an actual promissory note or other document ever existed to evidence and make 
the TAP obligation enforceable by 1K1. lnis ignores Paper wise , 1 
s ig ilet I , 111< i < \ (• I * 111 n I agreement with TAP. Additionally, JJOC objects for lack 
of foundation that Bramble is qualified to issue a legal opinion on the 
enforceability of the written TAP account receivable contract. There is nothing 
in the credentials ot Bramble to demons trait 
lias had tin) ii • . . '•'"'' »••* - -.I--. • 'contracts. 
Paragraphs 19, 24, 26 and 28 of Bramble's second affidavit presume that the 
auditor did not send a positive confirmation for the TAP account receivable. 
This factual assumption is wrong JJOl " did send it positive wrillen 
confirmation lour, 1 Vpusitti .n pagt/N J11 ' \U " l'< I1 ru h Humiblr nnm I 
IMIIni to «ius swoni testimony or statement that a positive confirmation was not 
sent. Hence, paragraphs 19, 24, 26 and 28 are factually wrong. 
Paragraph 22 of Bramble's second affidavit asserts that the account receivable 
went through the income statement beca^ 
VSIHi.Jv1" i (»'» '"'I" is f:\hv 11n ,K ' ni.II1 •* ' . - -.vent through the 
income statement nor did it increase sales. Christensen Deposition pages 79-80, 
(R 933), Jones Deposition page 34 (R 901). 
Paragraphs 31. 32, 34, 35 and 43 (Bramble's second affidavit) are assertions by 
Bramble that JJOC's audit opinion for March 31, 1993 was a "unqualified 
opinion". This simply was not true. The March 31, 1993 opinion was a 
qualified opinion which stated that TKI was not a "going concern". Bramble 
who supposedly is an expert should know that a "going concern" qualification 
in an audit report is not a "unqualified opinion". His assertions in paragraphs 
31, 32, 34, 35 and 43 are not borned out by the record. 
C. BRAMBLE'S THIRD AFFIDAVIT. (R 1065-1068) JJOC objects to 
Bramble's third affidavit for lacking in foundation and relevance. Mr. Bramble is not 
an attorney nor a judge nor has he had any formalized legal training sufficient that he 
can issue a legal opinion "JJOC claims they have no liability because there is no privity 
of contract" and further opines as to the legal effect of the statutory exceptions to 
U.C.A. §58-26-12. The affidavit is objectionable because it draws legal conclusions 
and is submitted by a non-qualified expert in legal matters. 
Bramble's assertion in paragraph 7 that its "obvious from footnote 11" that JJOC 
knew "the primary intent of the client in having the audit report done" was for those 
professional services to benefit or influence the Plaintiff in this case is illogical, is not 
borned out by anything established in the record and is self serving to justify opinions 
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previously rendered based mi kinky cisMiiuptiiMi.s ami l.iulh l';n Is When HMIII 
uiidutt Ilicii irpil.ii .inmiiil .unlit .IIKI afin issuing the audit report learn that the 
company has since decided to sell most of its assets to another, how is that privity of 
contract? How could that have been Paperwise's "primary intent" when there was "™ 
deal in Texas" according to its president Larry Edwards? (See actual 
Appellee's Statement n! kins piiye S hereof from hlwiinls hepnsmon p; - % 
920)), • . . 
In June of 1993, JJOC learned of the proposed sale of the assets of TKI to a 
Texas group. Their written audit report was completed on May 3rd and issued on May 
17th signed by the auditors. Footnote > the audited financiiil slakineiils kilnl linir 
• reissued. There is nothing 
i nisstated in footnote 11 which is dated June 30, 1993. What can Paperwise 
claim for that? Footnote 11 was not the proximate cause of any alleged damages to 
Paperwise. S AS (Statement of Accounting Standards) #1, All §;'>(') I requires that upon 
the subsequent discovery ol an cunt tli.il muy main iall\ ailed OK hium •:»' M "tnnt nls 
the a""* lit* n s ilia.) make a si lbsequent disclosure. 
JONES 1994 DEPOSITION. Gordon Jones deposition was taken by 
Texas attorneys on May 24, 1994 in another legal action pending in Texas on issues 
substantially different than the issues in the present litigai 
HI IW*M V\J^ in i|w |N»lh lyulin iiil DISIIM I CnuH <»i hulbs, Tex:is and centered on the 
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issues of whether or not JJOC had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Texas 
to be sued under Texas's Consumer Protection Statute, in Civil Cause No. 94-02088. 
The Texas District Court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction on July 
8, 1994. The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court in 
Case No. 95-0955. Paperwise in the present action relies heavily on the deposition of 
Jones taken in another jurisdiction dealing with issues significantly different than the 
issues in the present litigation. Surprisingly, Paperwise relies very little on the Jones 
Deposition taken in the present action or on the deposition of its own witness. JJOC 
objected to the use of the Jones Deposition in the present action taken in other unrelated 
proceedings. 
Paperwise furthermore misquotes the 1994 deposition in its brief in this matter. 
Paperwise's quotations to the effect that "Gordon Jones was advised of the terms of the 
TKA and TKI transaction not later than May 28, 1993" is not supported by the record. 
First, the JJOC written audit report and opinion was issued on May 17, 1993, eleven 
days prior to the quote from the Jones 1994 Deposition see pages 16, 21 and 55 (1994 
Jones Deposition). The 1994 Jones Deposition is not in the court file. Furthermore, 
in the 1994 deposition, Jones refers to a "unsigned settlement agreement and general 
release" that was seen by Jones at the end of June and early July (page 24) (our 
emphasis). Page 26 of the 1994 Deposition refers to a balance sheet and financial 
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statement of TKI dated June 30, 1993 that Jones never saw until two months prior to 
his 1997 deposition and several months after the commencement of this litigation. 
E. COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS: The lower court found the facts set 
forth in the findings because Paperwise could not then and cannot now in its brief cite 
any admissible deposition testimony, or other evidence to dispute those facts. 
Paperwise's citations in its brief on appeal are to 
(1) Bramble's faulty expert opinion affidavits, or 
(2) Jones 1994 deposition in another case, or 
(3) Unsigned documents5, or 
(4) Misstatements of facts taken from JJOC's Memorandum of Law (i.e. 
"audit materials" given on May 17, 1993). 
Lastly, Rule 56(c) requires that any facts be "material". A "material fact" is 
one which is essential to the case, defense, application, etc. and without which it could 
not be supported... One which tends to establish any of the issues raised." Black's 
Law Dictionary. Revised Fourth Edition (1968), at page 1128. Appellee offers its own 
definition: "a ' material fact' is one that makes a difference in the matter". For 
example, Paperwise in its brief (page 15, paragraphs 27 and 28) argues that the TAP 
account receivable represented 21.2 percent increase in assets or 27.6 percent of the 
total assets listed. What difference does that make if the TAP account receivable was 
5 These were large numbers of unsigned documents and drafts as the sale transaction 
evolved in July 1993 until the closing on August 16, 1993. 
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never transferred or sold to Paperwise as the corporate officers of TKI testified in their 
depositions? Paperwise's attempt to create material facts to prevent the Motion for 
Summary Judgment must fail. 
POINT II. 
THE TAP ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE WAS NEVER SOLD OR 
TRANSFERRED TO PAPERWISE. 
Assuming arguendo that the auditors misclassified or mis-audited the TAP 
account receivable, which JJOC denies, it is of no significance since the TAP account 
receivable was never sold or transferred to Paperwise as part of the Asset Acquisition 
Agreement. 
According to page 14 of the Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum (See 
Volume 4 of court file) and paragraph 1(a) of the Letter of Intent Agreement dated 
July 15, 1993 and the Asset Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 1993, (R 405-
501) accounts receivables of $530,000.00 of TKI including the TAP account receivable 
were left with TKI for the purpose of paying off some $300,000.00 to the IRS for 
unemployment taxes, $203,000.00 for the claim of Kissane, Woodbridge's claims and 
all other unknown liabilities. See the Deposition of Christensen, the accounting officer 
of TKI at pages 86, 107 and 121. (R 934, 935, 938). Edwards Deposition pages 83. 
(R541). The other officers can't remember, Lee Deposition pages 97-98. Paperwise's 
witness Kuehne doesn't know, Kuehne Deposition pages 60-61, 63-64. If the TAP 
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account receivable was not acquired by Paperwise, then it makes no difference whether 
or not it was properly audited. In any event, Paperwise would not be the injured party, 
but TKI or its shareholders would be. TKI and its shareholders are not the complaining 
parties. In the absence of "some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a 
personal stake in the outcome of the matter", Paperwise lacks standing. Barnard v. 
Motor Vehicle Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 905 P.2d 317 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1995). Lack of standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time. Olson 
v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Ut. 1986). Lack of standing is 
a question of law. Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Ut. 1989). 
POINT III. 
PAPERWISE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES 
Paperwise suffered no damages because it gave no consideration for the 
acquisition of the assets of TKI. Edwards Deposition pages 94-97, (R 922), 
Christensen Deposition pages 112, 115, 117, 118, 121, 128, (R 936-939), Lee 
Deposition pages 105-106, 101-102 (R911). 
A review of the relevant facts is important. Paperwise was created in May of 
1993 after JJOC issued its initial audit report on May 17, 1993. Paperwise did an 
initial stock offering in Texas on July 23, 1993 through the issuance of a Confidential 
Limited (Private) Offering Memorandum which was prepared by attorneys in Salt Lake 
City and in Dallas, Texas. Paperwise had no prior operating history nor any income 
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prior to the acquisition of the assets of TKI on August 16, 1993. When the assets of 
Paperwise were acquired, Paperwise issued additional common stock to shareholders 
of TKI, which were Larry Edwards, Winston Lee and Christensen. Paperwise paid no 
cash and did not transfer any property. Edwards Deposition pages 94-97, (R 922), Lee 
Deposition II pages 101-102, Christensen Deposition pages 117,112,128 (R 936-939). 
Paperwise gave employment to Edwards, Lee and Christensen for which they actually 
worked 40 hours a week. Approximately six months later in January of 1994, Edwards 
and Lee were forced to resign upon threat of termination (Lee Deposition pages 38-42) 
and in return for a release from liability surrendered and transferred any stock they 
should have received in Paperwise back to Paperwise. Christensen was terminated 
likewise by June of 1994 and transferred any stock he should have received back as did 
all other shareholders. Therefore, within six to twelve months after the asset 
acquisition, Paperwise reclaimed or retook the stock it issued to the shareholders of 
TKI but kept the TKI assets that were transferred. Three (3) years later in 1996, 
Paperwise failed and filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in Dallas, Texas. Edwards got "a 
lawsuit and a loss of a quarter of a million dollars", Edwards Deposition II page 109. 
Christensen got "six years experience, thirty-five pounds and a lot of gray hair", 
Christensen Deposition page 128. Lee got "experience" from the deal, Lee Deposition 
II page 114. Essentially, Paperwise stole the assets of TKI. 
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To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a 
wrong inflicted by Defendant and damage resulting to the Plaintiff therefrom. "Wrong 
without damage or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action." 22 
Am. Jur. 2d. Damages, Section 3, page 15 and cases cited thereunder. The legislature 
by mere fiat cannot authorize the recovery of damages which damages the Plaintiff 
either in its personal or its representative capacity has never sustained. Ibid. See 
generally: 1 Am. Jur. 2d. Actions, Section 69, 70 and Bank of Miami Beach v. 
Neuman, 163 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App.). Since Paperwise gave only stock in Paperwise 
as consideration for the transfer of the assets of TKI and within ten to twelve months 
cancelled and retook the stock back, it cannot point to any monetary damages suffered 
nor has it offered any evidence of any damages suffered as a result of acquiring some 
of the assets of TKI in August of 1993. In the absence of any damages, Paperwise has 
no cause of action and JJOC is entitled to summary judgment. 
POINT IV. 
PAPERWISE CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE UNDER UTAH LAW IN THE 
ABSENCE OF PRIVITY. 
Utah statutes prohibit any cause of action against certified public accountants by 
third parties who are not in "privity of contract" or for whose benefit the financial 
statements were not prepared. U.C.A. §58-26-12 6 (R 894) provides: 
6 The statute was repealed and reenacted with changes on May 1, 2000 as U.C.A. 
§58-26(a)-602. 
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"Privity. No person licensed or authorized to practice under this chapter or any 
of its employees, partners, members, officers or shareholders are liable to 
persons with whom they are not in privity of contract for civil damages resulting 
from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with 
professional services performed by him, except for: 
1. Acts, omissions, decisions or conduct that constitutes fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation; 
2. Other acts, omissions, decisions or conduct if the person knew that 
a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit 
or influence the particular person bringing the action; except, however, 
for the purposes of this sub-section, if the person: 
a. Identified in writing to the client those persons who are 
intended to rely on the services; and 
b. Sent a copy of the writing or similar statement to the 
persons identified in the writing or statement, then he or any of 
his employees, partners, members, officers or shareholders may 
be liable only to the persons intended to rely, in addition to those 
persons in privity of contract with them." 
The above-cited statute provides an absolute bar to legal actions against 
accountants for malpractice if statutory requirements are met. The elements of the 
statute are: 
1. Licensed under the Certified Public Accountant Licensing Act U.C.A. 
§58-26-1 et seq. There is no factual dispute that JJOC and Gordon Jones are 
licensed CPA's under the statute at all times material hereto. 
2. Privity of Contract. There is no factual dispute that Paper wise never 
existed prior to the time that the original audit was done. There is no factual 
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dispute that JJOC was retained by TKI, the Utah corporation for purposes of the 
annual audit ending March 31, 1993. There is no factual dispute that no party 
at any time ever paid JJOC for the audit performed. 
It is the generally accepted rule in the State of Utah that if a party does not have 
privity of contract, they cannot assert any contractual claims. Shire 
Development v. Frontier Investment, 779 P.2d 221 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Cox 
Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988). Paperwise, in fact has not asserted any contractual claims in its 
complaint. It seems clear there was no privity of contract between Paperwise 
and JJOC. 
3. Exception for fraud and intentional misrepresentations. Paperwise has 
not plead any intentional misrepresentation or fraud and therefore exception #1 
does not apply. There presently are no facts or evidence that would substantiate 
any claims for fraud or intentional misrepresentation. 
4. Other acts if the person knew the primary intent of the client was for the 
professional services to benefit or influence the person bringing the action. This 
exception to U.C.A. §58-26-12 has further requirements that: 
1. The persons be identified in writing who relied on the services, 
and 
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2. A copy of the writing be sent to the identifying persons intended 
to be benefitted. 
There is no proof or evidence that JJOC knew that a primary intent of TKI was 
for the professional services to benefit a particular person. Jones Deposition page 56 
(R 904), Edwards Deposition pages 81-82 (R920), Lee Deposition pages 50-51, 71 (R 
908), Christensen Deposition pages 60, 87 (R 931, 934). In fact, Edwards, the 
president of TKI, stated that as of the time of the March 31, 1993 audit was being 
conducted "there was no deal in Texas". Edwards Deposition page 81 (R 920). As 
a condition precedent to this sub-section of the statue, in the absence of any evidence 
that JJOC knew of the deal in Texas, the exceptions to sub-paragraph 2 have no 
application. Hence, JJOC cannot be required to provide a written notice to TKI or 
anyone else to the effect that only TKI may rely upon the audited financial statements 
in the absence of any proof that JJOC knew that third parties could be relying upon the 
audited financial statements. Paperwise has no evidence or proof whatsoever that JJOC 
knew of the proposed deal in Texas other than the unfounded and unsubstantiated 
conclusion of its expert based upon faulty factual assumptions. See generally, Milliner 
v. Elmer Fox and Company. 529 P.2d 806 (1974) wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed a dismissal of action against accountants and attorneys by purchasers of stock 
because of lack of privity between the third parties and accountants and lack of 
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knowledge by the accountants that potential purchasers of the stock may have relied 
upon the audited financial statements. The court in Milliner went on to say: 
"The purchasers of shares of stock belong to an unlimited class of equity holders 
who could not reasonably be foreseen to rely upon financial statements" at page 
808". 
Therefore, none of the above exceptions to the statute applies to JJOC in their 
March 31, 1993 audit of TKI. The statute is an absolute bar to Paperwise's action for 
negligent misrepresentation and negligence. The court granted JJOC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on this issue. 
Not only is lack of privity a complete defense under Utah statutes and Utah case 
law, it is the majority rule in the United States based on a long line of cases. The 
leading case is Ultramares Corporation v. Touche and Niven, 174 N.E. 441 (Ct. App. 
NY. 1931). In the famous decision written by Justice Cardozo, the New York Court 
of Appeals held that Touche and Niven CPA firm was not liable to third parties in the 
absence of privity of contract. This case is the national cornerstone in the development 
of law in this area. In Credit Alliance Corporation v. Arthur Anderson and Company. 
483 N.E. 2d 110 (Ct. App. NY 1985), later proceeding 1988 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 850 
and on remand 542 NYS 2d 901, reversed on other grounds 541 NYS 2d. 433, the 
Court of Appeals of New York again held that an accountant is not liable, absent 
privity of contract, to a third person who relies to his detriment upon negligently 
prepared financial statements. The court stated: 
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"Before accountants may be held liable and negligence to non-contractual parties 
who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports, certain prerequisites 
must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial 
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the 
furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely, and (3) 
there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them 
to that party or parties, which evinces the accountant's understanding of that 
party or parties' reliance." at page 118. 
Based upon the deposition testimony of Jones, Edwards, Christensen and Lee, 
JJOC was never aware until after the issuance of their audit report on May 17, 1993 
that the audited financials would be used for the purpose of the sale of some of its 
assets or that the audited report would be placed in the Private Offering Memorandum. 
Paperwise has no contrary evidence. There was no conduct on the part of the 
accountants linking them to Paperwise or to TKA. Under the standards enunciated in 
Ultramares and Credit Alliance, these accountants are not liable to Paperwise for conduct 
complained of even if they were negligent. JJOC expressly denies that there was any 
negligence in the preparation of the audit report. 
JJOC also submits that it is unreasonable to believe that Paperwise relied upon the 
audited financial statements when the statements had a "going concern" qualification and 
indicated that TKI had lost in excess of $533,000.00 in 1991, $1.8 million on 1992 and 
$555,325.10 in 1993, which is clearly set forth in the audit report. How could reasonable fact 
finders differ on whether or not reliance was justified given the "going concern" qualification 
and the substantial losses previously suffered by Paperwise? 
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JJOC believes that the assets of TKI were of inconsequential value and the real asset 
being purchased by Paperwise was the off-balance sheet technology that TKI claimed to have. 
It was the rights to technology which Paperwise wanted to exploit. None of that technology 
is historically reported on financial statements but constitutes the "idea", the "technical know-
how", the "license" to, and the right to "the high performance imaging software". 
CONCLUSION 
JJOC submits that the court's granting of summary judgment is justified on separate 
independent grounds including: 
(1) There is no evidence that TAP account receivable was ever transferred as part of 
the asset acquisition, (2) there is no evidence that Paperwise paid any consideration for or 
suffered any damages whatsoever, (3) the state statute provides a complete defense in the 
absence of the showing of a privity or exceptions to the statue, and (4) there are no "material 
facts" in dispute which would alter the outcome of the court's granting of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The facts relied upon by Paperwise are not substantiated by anything in 
the record and cannot be based upon their expert's faulty assumptions or manufacture of facts 
to support his opinion. The District Court's entry of Summary Judgment should be affirmed 
in all respects. 
DATED this j 7- day of June, G002. 
D^AMEfe&LEE, P.C. 
iael L. Deamer 
Attorneys for Jones, Jensen, Orton & Co. 
and Robert Gordon Jones, Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAPERWISE, INC., fka : FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INC., : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, a Utah partnership, : 
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an 
individual, : Civil No. 960905873-CV 
Defendants. : Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY, 
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH 
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC., 
a corporation, and its successors in 
interest, STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and 
WINSTON LEE, individuals, 
T # L ° , , $ T I M C T COURT 
Thi
* Judicial DlZwct 
OCT 0 5 2001 
By ^ - T U K B COUNTY 
SpuJycT^ S 
c\ 
Third Party Defendants. 
The motion of Defendants Jones, Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones, 
(hereinafter "JJOC") for summary judgment came on for hearing before the above-entitled court, 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, August 27,2001, 
at the courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah with Michael J. Petro, Esq. appearing on behalf of 
Plaintiff, Michael L. Deamer, Esq. appearing on behalf of JJOC and Gregory N. Hoole appearing 
on behalf of Third Party Defendants and the court having reviewed the memorandums of law, and 
affidavits and having heard argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises now 
enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Techknowlogy, Inc. (herein tfTKT) retained JJOC to perform its routine annual 
year-end audit for the period ending March 31, 1993. No other entity hired JJOC to perform said 
audit nor did any entity at any time pay for the audit services performed. 
2. TKI did not hire JJOC to perform an audit in connection with a proposed Asset 
Acquisition Agreement with Plaintiff or with any entity known as Newco, Charles Pace or any 
other entity or individual from Texas. 
3. Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence or proof of any kind that #OC or 
any of its officers, agents or employees had any knowledge of a proposed sale of TKI's assets to 
Plaintiff prior to the completion of their audit field work on May 3, 1993 and the issuance of their 
written audit report on May 17, 1993. 
4. In fact, there was substantial testimony that there was no deal in Texas at the time 
JJOC's audit report was issued and that TKI was in the process of raising money. Larry Edwards, 
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the president of TKI testified that he did not even tell JJOC they would be using their March 31, 
1993 audit report in a proposed Private Placement Memorandum of Plaintiffs'. 
5. The disputed portion of JJOC's audit report centers on an account receivable from 
a subsidiary company known as Techknowlogy Asia Pacific ("TAP") to which entity TKI lent 
some $250,000.00 for the payment of rent, utilities and the purchase of office furnishings. 
During the course of the audit, JJOC sent a positive written confirmation to TAP and received a 
signed contract from TAP memorializing the obligation of TAP to reimburse TKI for $250,000.00 
and additionally verified the existence of cancelled checks totaling at least $250,000.00 evidencing 
actual payments by TKI. 
6. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the TAP account receivable was transferred 
to Plaintiff as part of the Asset Acquisition Agreement and in fact, Steve Christensen, vice-
president and director of TKI would testified that the TAP account receivable was not transferred 
to Plaintiff. 
7. JJOC's audit report was issued on May 17, 1993 with a date of May 3, 1993, and 
concluded that TKI was unot a going concern" because it lost over $533,000.00 in 1991 from 
operations, $1.8 million in 1992 and $533,000.00 as of March 31, 1993. \ 
8. JJOC first learned of the proposed transfer of some of the assets to a group in Texas 
after the issuance of their audit report on May 17, 1993. As a result thereof, JJOC on June 30, 
1993, added a footnote 11 to the audit report, which footnote is dated June 30, 1993, disclosing 
a proposed sale of some of TKTs assets to a corporation in Texas. 
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9. Plaintiff Paperwise (formerly known as Techknowlogy Acquisition, Inc.) was a 
corporation formed in May, 1993 in Texas for the sole purpose of purchasing some (but not all) 
of the assets of TKI. Pursuant to a Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23, 
1993, Paperwise issued stock to the public for cash in July 1993. 
10. On August 16, 1993, TKI and Paperwise entered into an Asset Acquisition 
Agreement whereby Paperwise agreed to issue additional shares of its stock to the individual 
shareholders of TKI in return for a transfer of some (but not all) of the assets of TKI. 
11. Approximately $659,000.00 in accounts receivables and miscellaneous assets were 
retained by TKI to pay IRS taxes, the Kissane and Woodbridge claims and other scheduled 
liabilities. 
12. After the consummation of the Asset Acquisition Agreement between Paperwise 
and TKI on August 16, 1993, the former officers and directors of TKI became employees of 
Paperwise until they were terminated for cause variously in January of 1994 through June of 1994. 
13. When Plaintiff terminated the employment of the former TKI officers and directors 
it cancelled all of Paperwise stock issued to said individuals, in effect rescinding the Asset 
Acquisition Agreement of August 16, 1993, but did not return any of the assets of TK2 to its 
former owners or to TKI. 
14. Paperwise gave no other property, monies or consideration for the assets of TKI 
other than stock in Paperwise which it subsequently cancelled and rescinded within six to nine 
months after issuance. 
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15. In September 1996, more than three years after the Asset Acquisition Agreement, 
Paperwise failed and filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Dallas, Texas. 
16. Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no proof of any other damages suffered other than 
the bankruptcy of Paperwise in 1996. 
17. Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no evidence or proof that the TAP account 
receivable was actually transferred to Paperwise as part of the asset acquisition transaction with 
TKI. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) limits the liability of persons providing accounting 
services to those with whom the accountant is in privity. Under the statute, privity may extend 
beyond the client for whom services are provided "if the person knew that a primary intent of the 
client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the 
action...". 
2. There is no competent evidence in the record or submitted by Plaintiff that JJOC 
knew of the proposed asset sale or the identity of the proposed purchaser of TKI's assetl as of 
May 17, 1993, the date when the audit opinion was issued, hence the exceptions to privity statute 
do not extend to Paperwise. 
3. Extending all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the facts and 
the record, JJOC is entitled to the privity protection of U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) as each of the 
statutory elements appear from the record to have been met. 
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4. Plaintiffs contention that JJOC knew that TKI was cash strapped and seeking to 
raise money in advance of issuing its audit report is insufficient to extend JJOC's statutory privity 
protection as such an interpretation would imperil any accountant who undertook to perform 
services for an otherwise insolvent or thinly capitalized company. This is not the intention of the 
privity statute. 
5. The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 does not broaden or extend the 
privity protection of U.C. A. §58-26-12 (1990) based on the interpretation of the statute regarding 
"influencing a particular person" used in U.C.A. §58-26-12(2). 
6. The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 by JJOC was reasonable under 
Professional Accounting Standards SAS (Statement of Accountant Standards) No. 1, AU §561 
regarding an accountant's duty upon discovery of a subsequent event that may materially affect 
the financial statements. 
7. There is no evidence in the record that would support a finding that Plaintiff 
suffered any damage as a result of JJOC's conduct. 
8. Paperwise effectively rescinded the Asset Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 
1993 with TKI upon cancellation of stock issued in consideration of the sale of those assets, but 
failed to return any assets to TKI or its previous shareholders. As such, Paperwise suffered no 
damages. 
9. In the absence of any damages, any causes of action alleged by Paperwise must fail. 
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10. Plaintiffs claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are denied and 
Defendant JJOC is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as against Plaintiff Paperwise on all 
Paperwise claims. 
11. Upon the grant of summary judgment in JJOC's favor as against Plaintiff 
Paperwise, JJOC may voluntarily withdraw its Third Party Complaint against Defendants Larry 
Edward and Mary Beth Edwards, Techknowlogy, Inc., Steven Christensen and Winston Lee. 
DATED this I day of 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehi 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
uprtagl L. Deamer 
attorneys for Defendants 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants 
5cqmld/568 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 4-502 of the Judicial Code of Administration, I hereby certify that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, on the 21* day 
of September, 2001, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Gregory N. Hoole 
KTRTON&MCCONKIE 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
£6rti<m* 
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
Third Judicial District 
°cro52ooi 
By__m_jUTLAKE COUNTY 
Deputy ( 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAPERWISE, INC., fka 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, a Utah partnership, 
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY, 
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH 
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC., 
a corporation, and its successors in 
interest, STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and 
WINSTON LEE, individuals, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960905873-CV 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
Third Party Defendants. 
Based upon the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered concurrently herewith, 
and good cause appearing, now therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants Jones, 
Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment be and the 
same is hereby granted and the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
No attorneys' fees are awarded and costs in the amount of $ *• •-"" is hereby awarded 
to Defendants JJOC as against Plaintiff Paperwise. 
JJOC's Third Party Complaint is hereby voluntarily withdrawn and dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, each party to bear its own attorneys fees, court 
costs and expenses. 
DATED this H day o f Q ^ H ^ ^ , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
Honorable RonaL 
District Court Ju 
Michael J. Petro 
£ys for Plaintiff 
(J /U/C #44*0^ 
zl L. Deamer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants 
ft! M tk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 4-502 of the Judicial Code of Administration, I hereby certify that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of SUMMARY JUDGMENT, on the 21* day of September, 2001, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Gregory N. Hoole 
KIRTON & MCCONKIE 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
fi^m^ 
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CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT LICENSING ACT 58-26-13 
(e) the licensee is in good standing as a CPA and not subject to any order 
of revocation, suspension, or probation. 
(2) Each CPA emeritus registration expires on August 31 of each even-
numbered year. 
(3) Registrants may not engage m the practice of public accountancy. 
(4) Registrants are not required to fulfill the continuing professional edu-
cation or quality review provisions of this chapter. 
(5) A registrant may reinstate his CPA license by complying with the 
provisions of Section 58-26-8. 
(6) Each registrant is responsible for renewing his registration, according to 
procedures that the board establishes m accordance with Section 58-1-308 
concerning renewals and notification to licensee and certificate holders. 
History: C. 1953, 58-26-11, enacted by L. turn 58-1-308" for "Section 58-1-14" in Subsec-
1990, ch. 242, § 11; 1993, ch. 297, § 156; tion (6) 
1994, ch. 313, § 56. The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
Amendment Notes- — The 1993 amend- substituted "Section 63-38-3.2" for "Subsection 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, substituted "Sec- 63-38-3(2)" in Subsection (lXc). 
58-26-12. Privity. 
No person licensed or authorized to practice under this chapter or any of his* 
employees, partners, members, oflBcers, or shareholders are Uable to persons 
with whom they are not in pnvity of contract for civil damages resulting from 
acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional 
services performed by him, except for: 
(1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or 
intentional misrepresentations; or 
(2) other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person knew that 
a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or 
influence the particular person bringing the action; except, however, for 
the purposes of this subsection, if the person: 
(a) identified in writing to the client those persons who are in-
tended to rely on the services; and 
(b) sent a copy of the writing or similar statement to the persons 
identified in the writing or statement, then he or any of his employees, 
partners, members, oflBcers, or shareholders may be liable only to the 
persons intended to rely, in addition to those persons in privity of-
contract with him. 
History: C. 1963, 58-26-12, enacted by L. 
1990, chu 242, § 12. 
58-26-13. Certificates or licenses held on April 23, 1990 — 
Expiration of certificates. 
(1) (a) Certificates current as of April 23, 1990, are valid evidence that the 
holder fulfilled the requirements of prior law. The board shall consider the 
certificates in reviewing qualifications for licensing under this chapter; 
however, the holder of a certificate may not practice as a certified public 
accountant if not otherwise allowed under this chapter. 
(b) All certificates issued expire and are subject td renewal on August 31 
of each even-numbered year beginning in 1990. 
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